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How do we best design social institutions for the advancement of learning? 
 The philosophers have ignored the social structure of science.  
The point, however, is to change it.  
(Kitcher 1990 : 22) 
1. Introduction 
A common problematic trait in some popular accounts of the history of science is to overly focus on 
the individuals. Einstein, Darwin, and Galileo are household names and exceptional individuals worthy 
of attention. But this view tends to overlook the importance of the social institutions that create the 
epistemic environment in which these individuals operate; and the conditions for how epistemic 
progress can be made. As Fleck remarked, without this proper context, one’s analysis will ultimately 
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be fruitless (1979 : 21). In this paper, I elucidate features of the intergenerational structure of scientific 
communities which have been underexplored: viz. the capacity of scientists to cooperate 
intergenerationally to achieve epistemic progress without there being any explicit intentional creativity 
(Henrich 2016). Building on an observation by Tomasello (1999) I shall term this “virtual 
collaboration”. Additionally, I outline a range of tools from theoretical biology and behavioural science 
that can make features of intergenerational epistemic work clearer so that they can be properly 
explored and utilised. My aim in this paper is to introduce novel sets of experimental data and concepts 
into the debates about how to structure scientific communities in order to optimise cognitive diversity. 
 The paper is structured as follows: in the next section I briefly distinguish a range of important 
intra- and inter-generational factors discussed by other theorists. This then provides us with the 
necessary background to discuss how intergenerational ‘creativity without intention’ can take place. In 
the final section of the paper I speculate on how this general fact about human communities might be 
utilised for scientific progress. 
2. Untangling intergenerational factors 
Knowledge accumulation is widely recognised as a major feature of scientific communities. There are 
various important aspects of this that need to be outlined before I can discuss the notion of virtual 
collaboration. Firstly, we need to distinguish between differing temporal aspects of a community of 
inquiry: what I shall refer to as synchronic and diachronic. Much of the philosophical and sociological 
discussion of scientific communities focuses on a synchronic temporal region. I.e. they examine the 
structure of the community – its institutions and practices – in a contemporary time-slice or how it 
was at some historical epoch. For instance, discussions about the roles of ridicule and other social 
factors and how these impact group decision-making and collaboration often focus on a particular 
group over a short period of time (Sunstein 2005; and see D’Agostino 2008 for an overview). In 
contrast, we can also consider diachronic aspects – how a particular community of enquiry is 
structured over an extended period of historical time. My focus is on this latter aspect.  
A second distinction is between social and epistemic features of this diachronic temporal scale. 
From a social perspective we can consider how a community of inquiry inculcates new members 
through their acquisition of a range of social practices and relevant bodies of knowledge for the 
specific field (see Menary & Gillett 2017 : 78-79). But there is also an epistemic element as well which 
relates to the transmission of information from one generation to the next. However, this distinction 
is not clear cut for a number of reasons. For instance, the developmental trajectories of specific agents 
into the practices of a particular scientific practice involve the extensive acquisition of practices, 
techniques, and general know-how related to the tools and theories of a particular scientific field 
(Nersessian 2005). As such, the developmental trajectory of a young scientist involves being taught 
the tools for navigating certain epistemic matters. We can adopt terminology from theoretical biology 
to label this a “developmental niche” (Flynn et al 2013). This is a structured or “seeded” learning 
environment whereby the activities of the previous generation enhance the learning pathways of 
novices through what Sterelny calls “hybrid learning” (2012). Hybrid learning involves a mixture of 
processes including direct teaching, but also the creation of a learning environment which improves 
the trial-and-error learning of the novice. Vygotsky (1978 : 84-91) referred to this as the “zone of 
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proximal development”; whereby a novice’s capacities in a particular task domain are improved by the 
presence of an expert who can steer the efforts of a novice so that they are more successful. For 
instance, in the complex procedures involved in interpreting fMRI data, Alač & Hutchins (2005) note 
that the expert scaffolds much of the interpretative work done by the novice. This often involves the 
creation of intermediary and temporary representational devices to facilitate this, such as diagrams and 
visual aids. 
But the intersection of social and epistemic aspects in the diachronic structure of communities 
of inquiry is not just limited to the developmental niche. New members of the scientific community 
are inculcated into the practices, techniques, and knowledge of that particular community. This is an 
enculturating factor on the cognitive processes of new members, which will include certain kinds of 
theoretical vocabularies and “thought styles” (Fleck 1979). Thought styles here refers to modes and 
styles of thinking that are prevalent in specific communities that structure how the domain space is 
apprehended. For instance, the geographic information sciences operate with a digital numerical and 
discrete conception of space (Hutchins 1995). The structure of these enculturating processes is shaped 
by the activities of the previous generation and have long-lasting effects. Indeed, the activity of one 
generation alters the problem spaces of the next generation. Sterelny (2003 : 148) refers to this as 
“epistemic engineering”. To return to the example of the geographic information sciences, 
contemporary navigational and map-making problems take place in a computational problem space 
that has been radically reshaped by the empirical and theoretical work of multiple generations of 
geographers (Bray 2014; Hutchins 1995; Snyder 1987). This highlights a distinctive aspect about 
human social groups – “cumulative culture” – whereby novel features of a skill, technique, or artefact 
are successfully transmitted from one generation to another in a reliable manner. Tomasello (1999) 
has identified cumulative culture in general as a distinctive trait of our species1. Here we are particularly 
concerned with how one generation is able to alter the epistemic problem spaces in a downstream 
manner so that future generations can build from these starting points.  
Arguably, scientific communities are the most rarefied form of this distinctly human trait for 
the accumulation of knowledge and technologies because institutional structures facilitate the 
critiquing and the improvement of practices, techniques, and theories (e.g. such diverse views as 
Ladyman & Ross’ (2007) ontic structural realism and Stanford’s (2016) integrative naturalism agree on 
this point). However, whilst some might see this as an overly obvious point, others will argue, à la 
Kuhn (1970), that a notable feature of scientific communities is their occasional habit of disregarding 
the work of previous generations and abandoning it in favour of alternative views. To this I would 
suggest that even with the most extreme reading of “Kuhnian losses” in a paradigm shift it is arguable 
that there is still some carry over of some of the material and epistemic achievements of previous 
generations (even if this cannot be identified in a non-ad hoc manner). Indeed, even in the weakest 
possible sense we can argue that the problem space in which a new paradigm is put forward involves 
an epistemic environment that has been extensively engineered through the perceived failures, 
inexplicable empirical findings, and other conceptual issues of the previous paradigm. For instance, in 
the science of navigation the introduction in the Twelfth century of the magnetic compass in Europe 
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(Hutchins 1995 : 93)2 not only radically reshaped how people orientated in space (from the East-West 
axis of the passage of the sun to a North-South axis); it also reshaped how people thought about and 
conceived of space at a deeper level. As Hutchins notes, many advanced modern navigators are taught 
to “think like a compass” (141). And it also allowed for a much more accurate and discreet 
measurement of angles in space (whilst operating alongside a range of other tools and techniques)3. 
But despite this, much of the traditional problem space of European navigation remained – despite 
being obsolete or anachronistic in some cases.  
A related issue here of the intergenerational structure of scientific communities is the extent 
to which social issues can impact on epistemic matters to prevent the advancement of new ideas and 
theories. It is often commented that new and superior theories do not win the day purely on epistemic 
grounds – a point famously contested by Feyerabend (1975). I think one of the main strengths of 
Kitcher’s work (1990, 1993, 1998) is the recognition that we must take these social factors into 
consideration when considering epistemic matters. Viz. that we should not treat scientific 
communities as populated by ‘epistemic saints’ motivated only by the truth; and that epistemic and 
non-epistemic factors can come together to create a “valuable cognitive diversity” (1993 : 306).  
On the other hand, it is notable that the problem of failing to consider viable alternative 
hypotheses – what Stanford (2015) calls the problem of “unconceived alternatives” – is exacerbated 
by the developmental aspect of scientific communities that we have been discussing because they can 
lead to a fostering of certain conservative elements. Such a danger was noted by Max Planck who once 
remarked that scientific progress is not made through truth beating out falsity but because the 
opponents of an idea eventually die. Recent work by Azoulay and colleagues (2015) offers some 
empirical evidence to support this claim. They examined the publication histories of multiple fields 
before and the after the death of 452 eminent scientists and found that the publication rates of non-
collaborators of the ‘star scientists’ in these fields increased in a dramatic respect to collaborators 
(whose publication rates went downwards). Empirical evidence supporting what has come to be 
known as “Planck’s Principle” can be placed alongside a wide range of other social studies and 
theoretical models which point to the dangers and complications of social factors on epistemic matters 
(see D’Agostino 2008 for an overview). These should not be trivialised and indeed must be explored 
so that they can be mitigated or channelled.  
This instance of epistemic dysfunction occurs because of the intergenerational structure of 
scientific communities. However, conservatism in scientific communities is not necessarily a merely 
negative aspect. Kuhn (1977) recognised that conservative elements within a community of inquirers 
are necessary for binding that community together and offsetting the innovators who try to drag a 
community in multiple directions across the “epistemic landscape”. He labelled this balance the 
“essential tension”. Recent modelling work offers support for this view by suggesting that diversity of 
opinion on epistemic matters needs to be temporary to prevent the splintering of the community; and 
that this fragmenting of the community leads to a decline in epistemic progress (Bailetti et al 2015; 
Zollman 2010). Excellent work by D’Agostino (2008) has “naturalised” the essential tension by 
collating the relevant research in the various social and behavioural sciences which relate to 
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conservative elements in collaborative epistemic settings. For instance, heuristics, biases, and 
metaphors (e.g. features of a thought style) can have a serious impact not only on what kinds of 
theories are considered but also who is granted epistemic warrant in a community.  
D’Agostino (2008) notes that it is important to consider the social and affective settings of a 
community of enquiry: one with a negative affective valence will reduce the chances of diverse ideas 
being voiced within the community. For instance, the phenomena of “ridicule” (Sunstein 2005) can 
have a serious impact on the extent to which agents feel they can put forward suggestions in a group 
decision-making situation (also see Fricker 2007 who points out epistemic dysfunctions resulting from 
prejudicial stereotypes – what she terms “epistemic injustice”). D’Agostino also discusses the positive 
impacts of social factors in well-structured settings. For instance, “assembly bonus effects” – whereby 
a group is able to outperform the potential of its best member (Collins & Guetzkow 1964 : 58-60) – 
have been observed in the (in)famous Wason selection task. Individual performance on this task has 
a 10% success rate, but group performance is at a much higher 80% – Mercier & Sperber (2011 : 61-
62) contend that this is because this test design reveals that human agents have a preference for 
confirmation bias. In this task setting, group work can counteract what is usually a negative individual 
trait because we are better at criticising others rather than ourselves; as such, it is collectively beneficial 
(also see Smart 2017). In general, D’Agostino (2008) notes that the structure of the problem space is 
crucial for whether it facilitates or inhibits assembly bonus effects. Given that scientific problem-
solving has increasingly necessitated collaboration (Andersen 2016), it is crucial to explore what types 
of problem-situations and what kinds of group structure leads to either “collaborative facilitation” or 
“collaborative inhibition”4.  
This brief overview shows that both the positive and the negative factors at the synchronic 
temporal level and the negative aspects of diachronic temporal dimension are being considered both 
theoretically and empirically in the literature. My aim in the remainder of this essay is to supplement 
these discussions by outlining an important positive aspect of the diachronic structure of scientific 
communities which I think has been overlooked: what I shall call, using a phrase adapted from 
Tomasello’s work (1999), “virtual collaboration”. 
3. Virtual Collaboration 
In the previous section I outlined theoretical and empirical work that explores the interplay of social 
and epistemic factors across both synchronic and diachronic temporal domains which impacts on 
epistemic progress both negatively and positively. In this section my aim is to supplement this work 
by discussing recent work in theoretical biology and the behavioural sciences by Henrich and 
colleagues (Henrich 2016; Muthukrishna et al 2014). This work has shown that epistemic engineering, 
and the kinds of bricolage that occurs in the transfer of ideas and material across generations, can lead 
to epistemic progress without requiring a single moment of intentional genius. I think that this is an 
underappreciated point in science and technology studies. I will now outline Henrich and colleagues’ 
views and findings before showing how this work applies to scientific communities. My aim is to make 
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this work more widely understood in debates about the structure of scientific communities so that 
they can be restructured to make the most of this general feature of our species.  
Recent debates in evolutionary psychology have concerned the role and importance of cultural 
inheritance to our species’ success: Boyd, Richerson and Henrich point out that we inhabit an 
incredibly large area of the planet in a wide range of diverse ecosystems – more so than any other 
terrestrial invertebrate species (2011 : 10918). The traditional explanation for this success claimed that 
it is based on our superior general intelligence and capacity for problem solving (e.g. Pinker 2010). On 
this older evolutionary psychology account, these capacities are specifically genetically endowed; 
culture and social learning are mere add-ons or late additions. In contrast, Henrich has recently argued 
that this view is outdated and fails to acknowledge that cultural evolution has been the “central force” 
driving human genetic evolution for the last few hundred thousand years (2016 : 315-316)5. Against 
the older view in evolutionary psychology, Boyd and colleagues (2011) present two sets of evidence 
from what they refer to as “natural experiments” from the historical record: [1] lost European 
explorers; and [2] the loss of technology and practices in small isolated populations. They go on to 
claim that being able to survive in a wide range of hostile environments is dependent on our cultural 
niche and how knowledge can be accumulated across generations. Not even the smartest of us, Boyd 
and colleagues argue, could learn to live in a de novo environment through individual learning. This is 
a point that they think Pinker and others have misunderstood. Instead, “[w]e owe our success to our 
uniquely developed ability to learn from others” so as to tackle cognitive tasks utilising cognitive 
achievements “…that are too complex for any single individual to invent during their lifetime” (2011 : 
10918).  
During the period of colonial expansion and exploration, there are numerous cases in the 
historical record in which European explorers ended up stranded in a novel environment, fail to adapt 
to the local conditions, and subsequently die (see Henrich 2016 : ch3). In many of these cases the 
Europeans died in close proximity to an indigenous population who were flourishing in the very same 
environment. Boyd and colleagues give the case of the Franklin’s expedition of 1845–1846 who 
perished from starvation and scurvy whilst seeking the Northwest Passage near the Artic (2011 : 
10920). This is a particularly interesting case because approximately fifty years later Roald Amundsen 
spent two winters in the same region and became the first European to successfully traverse the 
Northwest Passage. The key difference was that he sought out and learnt from the indigenous 
population – adopting their tools and techniques for surviving in an inhospitable environment 
(Henrich 2016 : 26). Another example is the ill-fated Willis and Burke expedition in 1860 into the 
Australian outback of the Northern Territory. Their provisions were exhausted too quickly and they 
were only able to survive by the good graces of the indigenous population who gave them gifts of 
food including a cake made of a local plant product called nardoo (Marsilea drummondii). Willis and 
Burke sought out the plant by themselves and attempted to live off the crop, but unbeknownst to 
them nardoo is toxic unless processed properly, and this contributed to their deaths (Henrich 2016 : 
27-30).    
In a second set of natural experiments Boyd and colleagues (2011) outline cases were a small 
isolated local population lose sets of sophisticated tools and practices. Perhaps the most famous case 
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is of indigenous Tasmanians who were separated from mainland Australia approximately 12,000 years 
ago when the sea levels rose. In this period of isolation, the Tasmanians began to lose complex tools. 
In the archaeological record it can be seen that their watercraft became simple and inefficient; their 
clothing became less complex; and their tool kits became much simpler – being limited to only 24 
items in comparison with their contemporaries across the Bass Strait in Victoria who had a toolkit of 
hundreds of specialised tools (see Henrich 2016 : 220-222 for details). Another more recent example 
relates to a tribe of Inuit in Northwest Greenland who were severely hit with a plague in approximately 
1820 (Boyd et al 2011 : 10920). All the elders of the tribe were killed along with the complete loss of 
cultural knowledge for how to make a range of important technologies and the associated skills for 
how to use them (e.g. kayaks). For the next few decades the tribe struggled by, diminishing in 
population, until they were discovered by another tribe who re-taught them the equivalent skills and 
techniques to those which they had lost. There are many more examples of this in the historical record. 
We can take these two sets of natural experiments as an existence proof that it takes more 
than pure intelligence to make it in a novel environment. Instead it is our prosocial nature, and aptitude 
for social learning, that are really important. Henrich captures the central issue here by presenting it 
as a dichotomy in a thought experiment (2016 : 214-215). He imagines two prehuman communities 
composed of homogeneous populations: Geniuses and Butterflies. The geniuses are very inventive and 
create many new innovations but they are not very social and so are unlikely to pass them on to their 
conspecifics. In contrast, the butterflies are not smart but are incredibly social. Henrich’s point is that 
even though the butterflies are far inferior in terms of intellect compared to the geniuses, they are 
much more likely to retain any innovations that they do stumble across. Whilst the genius population 
might generate far more innovations these are not retained or communicated intergenerationally 
because they are not social enough, and do not effectively share their knowledge. Thus, any 
innovations are lost. One might respond to this thought experiment that it is rather trite and does not 
really prove any point except that some degree of communication is necessary6. But recently an 
interesting series of lab-based experiments have explored Henrich’s claim that prosociality is the key 
ingredient to our species’ success (Derex et al 2013; Muthukrishna et al 2014). I now outline these 
before turning to their implications for scientific communities.  
In two experiments by Muthukrishna and colleagues (2014) they explore the importance of 
prosociality to the retention of a toy ‘cultural skill’. These experiments were designed to explore the 
relational difference that Henrich’s ‘genius vs. butterfly’ thought experiment highlights: that prosocial 
relations are required not only for cultural transmission but for cumulative culture (viz. the high-
fidelity retention of innovations that build on previous innovations, etc.). In the first section I followed 
Tomasello (1999) in identifying this as a core feature of human culture, and suggested that this is a 
particularly pertinent feature of scientific communities. In Muthukrishna and colleagues’ experiments, 
participants were arranged into one of two groups and into one of ten cultural generations. In group 
A participants had access to only one cultural parent (a member of the previous generation). In group 
B participants had access to five cultural parents. Participants were rewarded in the task for both 
achieving the cultural product with a high degree of success and also for how well their immediate 
descendants in the next generation performed the task (in experiment one this was to use a piece of 
imaging software to create a target image; in experiment two the goal was to tie a knot for rock 
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climbing). Participants were only able to influence the behaviour of the following generation through 
mediated and controlled communication that they could construct to pass on instructions (in 
experiment one this was by a set of written instructions; in experiment two this was a short video)7. 
The upshot of both experiments was that by the tenth generation the performance of every member 
of group B (who had access to five models) was superior in their performance to members of group 
A. 
Although intriguing, these experiments are limited by the fact that the task goal is not 
functional. As such, the assessment criteria in the experiment is merely about whether the cultural 
product was successfully copied without any consideration about whether this could be related to what 
role this cultural product achieves. This issue is mitigated in experiments by Derex and colleagues 
(2013) who used a computer simulation to test groups of participants at creating one of two cultural 
products – easy and difficult – that were used to attain in-game resources. Additionally, participants 
were informed that the cultural products could be modified so as to improve performance. As in the 
previous experiments, Derex and colleagues were also investigating the importance of social groups 
on the maintenance of cultural complexity across generations. They found that as group size increases 
not only is there a better retention of the cultural skill and product, but there were also more frequent 
improvements and diversity (2013 : 389).    
In particular, it is this aspect of improvement and refinement across generations, and how this 
is fostered by prosociality, that I think is most relevant to science and technology studies. Henrich’s 
gambit is that innovation in a community can occur in multiple ways (2016 : 213). So, whilst it is 
undeniable that some innovations are the products of intentional creative acts of genius; we should 
also recognise that they can also be the product of lucky errors, novel recombinations, and chance 
insights that arise through the social interconnectedness of a community of enquiry across time. Like Henrich, 
Tomasello emphasises how cooperative our species is in comparison to other primates (also see Dean 
et al 2012 for a nice set of comparative experimental results demonstrating this). He differentiates 
between two kinds of collaboration: [1] actual collaboration that takes place in the synchronic temporal 
plane; and [2] virtual collaboration which takes place across historical time (1999 : 41).  
The capacity of humans to collaborate virtually across generations allows us to tackle problems 
that would otherwise defy us – e.g. cognitive tasks that involve regularities occurring at temporal scales 
that would otherwise be invisible (Boyd et al 2011; Henrich 2016; Shea 2009). Tasks such as farming 
are so variable that the probability of a single agent acquiring good practices and strategies through 
individual learning is vastly improbable in comparison to acquiring a relatively good practice from a 
cultural niche in which the knowledge and appropriate behaviour is imitated and inherited. As Shea 
puts it: “…the information available to individuals is just too impoverished to allow them on their 
own to build up much knowledge about likely crop yields” because cases like these involves outcomes 
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arguably abstracts out entirely the factor that the experiment is supposed to measure – prosociality. However, whilst I 
think it is important to recognise this limitation, it is also important to note that this is a lab-based experiment that sits 
within a wide range of ethnographic field work and theoretical modelling that suggests that prosociality is vital for human 
cultural evolution (see Muthukrishna et al 2014 : 1, 5-7 for details). Additionally, one can defend these experiments by 
arguing that a necessary aspect of lab-based experiments is that variables are appropriately controlled. And that this was a 
necessary first step in exploring sociality in an ‘intergenerational’ context in a lab-based setting. From this basis, future lab-
based experiments could potentially explore exchanging the mediated communication for some other form of direct 
communication with a time constraint, etc.  
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that “…occur on a timescale that is of little use for individual learners” (2009 : 2435). Additionally, if 
it is a cumulative cultural niche, then knowledge and practices will become increasingly refined. The 
intergenerational transmission of partially accumulated knowledge allows for the detection of 
regularities at temporal scales which would otherwise be invisible to individuals within their limited 
lifespans. For instance, in the geographic information sciences, the task of mapping the entire surface 
of the Earth with a discreet framework (e.g. the Mercator projection) took more than four centuries 
and thousands of individuals – with a complete map not appearing until 1972 (Snyder 1987 : 41). 
Henrich’s major claim is that for a cultural species such as ourselves it is our sociality rather 
than innate intelligence that is more important for explaining our success (2016 : 228). He labels this 
provocative notion the “collective brain” (212). He goes on to argue that demographic factors – such 
as the size and interconnectedness of the group – are crucial for epistemic progress. Such claims have 
been previously explored in the philosophy of science literature. Thagard (1993) has likened scientific 
communities to communication systems and notes that they are replete with asymmetric 
communication channels (due to four factors: sparseness of connectivity; asynchronous 
communication; slow transmission; and incomplete transmission). This asymmetry can prevent 
groupthink by buffering the flow of information and can lead to cognitive diversity. Conversely, von 
Hippel (1994) has identified that “sticky information” – information that is hard to transmit – can lead 
to suboptimal explorations of epistemic landscapes. Furthermore, differing kinds of communication 
channels can impact on collaborative work and cognitive diversity: e.g. face-to-face between colleagues 
or in an apprentice-master relationship; journal articles and experimental reports; data sets; conference 
papers; textbooks – each of these has an impact on how information is transferred and processed. But 
although Henrich certainly overlooks these factors as well as questions concerning the composition 
of a community of inquiry (as is explored in theoretical models by Kitcher (1993), Weisberg (2010), 
and Zollman (2010)); I think that there is something additive here about the notion of virtual 
collaboration (as intergenerational innovation that is possible without intentional creativity). This can 
be clarified with a simple example. 
According to anthropologists, the Inuit people of the artic region are regarded as one of the 
most adaptive cultures on the planet (Aporta & Higgs 2005). When the Inuit of west Greenland began 
adopting firearms they found that they were difficult to use whilst steering a Kayak (Boyd et al 2011:  
10922). Thus, demonstrating the mutual interdependencies of tools and techniques in a particular 
community – what Hutchins has called a “cognitive ecology” (1995). In 1824 a prominent hunter tried 
to redesign and adjust his kayak so he could use a rifle. He made a rudder but it didn't work very well. 
Younger hunters tried to imitate him despite the lack of success partly because of his prestige. But 
they took to hiding the rudders under the waterline to hide their shame for not being able to do it very 
well. This unintentional and serendipitous innovation led to greatly improved performance. 
Although deep understanding is often emphasised in scientific communities, here we have an 
example of how trial-and-error arising through social interactions in a sufficiently high degree can lead 
to progress. Arguably, there are many such cases in scientific practices. For instance, Nersessian’s 
(2005) cognitive-historical analysis of a biomedical engineering laboratory (engaged in trying to create 
artificial blood vessels) discovered that many of the models and experimental apparatuses were 
gerrymandered and redesigned by successive members of the lab who built upon and adapted each 
other’s designs across generations. As such, collectively they were able to gradually understand and 
tackle many sub-problems involved in trying to design artificial blood vessels (e.g. modelling the sheer 
forces involved). What is interesting in these adjustments is that although they are retained across 
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generations of experimentalists – as PhD and postdocs join and leave the lab – they do not strictly 
have a shared or singular purpose. Instead, they are all working on subproblems that are not necessarily 
related. And yet, despite the nonlinear accumulation of refinements in the experimental equipment, 
epistemic progress can be made.  
To return to the geographic information sciences, there are many examples of what 
D’Agostino evocatively refers to as soldiers (without generals) engaged in local, incremental “gradual 
attrition” of a particular problem space (2008 : 304). For instance, modern computers and the internet 
have made the production of thematic maps (the overlapping of geographic areas with data about 
people and places) far easier (Bray 2014 : 171-175). Since 1996 there have been a number of internet 
based geographic information systems (GIS) – the most famous of which is Google Maps (itself a 
product of numerous acquisitions of other companies and GIS, e.g. Where 2 Technologies, 
Earthviewer, etc.). A competitor, OpenStreetMap, demonstrates this even further. Inspired by the 
success of opensource networks such as Linux and Wikipedia; OpenStreetMap provides users with 
maps that are comprised entirely from data collected by amateurs – “crowdsourced cartography” – to 
avoid the monopolising of maps by governments and big companies (Bray 2014 : 186, 191). Each of 
these systems is the product of myriad interactions and refinements on shared frameworks and 
standards (e.g. the Mercator projection). Many of these improvements and refinements in these GIS 
come from non-intentional acts and the sheer quantity of individuals involved in their use and 
incidental advancement that arises out of these multiple connections. 
4. Applications and speculations  
The question now arises: how can these findings feasibly be used to structure scientific communities 
so as to optimise epistemic progress? There are a number of complicating factors in trying to generate 
these sorts of social interconnectedness that could be productive in modern scientific communities. 
Firstly, modern science is incredibly vast and diverse. As Braun and Schubert (2003 : 185) put it: the 
“explosion of knowledge” which began in the Enlightenment continues at an unprecedented degree 
into the current information engorged era, and this entails that “…it has become possible for an 
individual to comprehend only a few of the fragments”. Such is the fragmentation of knowledge that 
some philosophers even debate the unity of science as a project (e.g. Dupré 1993; cf. Ladyman & Ross 
2007).  
Fahrbach (2011) notes that 80% of all scientific work has occurred since the 1950s, which 
indicates an exponential growth. As such, as time goes on and new fields and problem spaces continue 
to emerge it becomes increasingly difficult to imagine a pedagogical setting in which there is a sufficient 
degree of social interconnectedness between fields to facilitate productive virtual collaboration. This 
entails that the success of the many scientific fields into investigating nature creates a situation where: 
 
To avoid drowning in the ever expanding ocean of knowledge, each of us typically grasps 
for one or two floating spars which we clutch as if our life depended on them and 
thereafter seldom look to the right or left. To look beyond one’s own spar is to be 
overwhelmed by the ocean’s magnitude: better to remain ignorant of all but our own tiny 
province. (Braun & Schubert 2003 : 185)   
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As Andersen (2016) has observed, this abundance has led to an increase in both collaboration 
and specialisation. This relates to another complicating factor. Humphreys (2004) has written 
extensively on how much of modern science is heavily dependent on computers to tackle data-
intensive problem spaces. For instance, DNA sequencing, turbulent flows in physics, and the search 
of exoplanets in astronomy are three examples of problem spaces that are infeasible to be computed 
“by hand”. The reliance on computational resources combines with the radically collaborative nature 
of many modern scientific problems, where teams are composed of narrow specialists, to create an 
epistemic and social environment that is not conducive to the recombinatorial potential of virtual 
collaboration. 
Whilst these circumstances are certainly problematic I suggest that they are not solely negative 
aspects. For instance, the intensely collaborative nature of many problem areas requiring increasing 
interdisciplinary cooperation – whilst certainly leading to increasing specialisation and narrowness of 
focus for some individuals – will also produce the conditions under which other agents have increased 
opportunities to engage in the sorts of ideational cross-pollination that engenders virtual collaboration. 
Indeed, D’Agostino identifies problem spaces which are “dynamically and complexly looped” as one’s 
which are ripest for facilitating assembly bonus effects and promoting cognitive diversity because they 
defy resolution by solitary individuals (2008 : 304). However, the nature of problem spaces, or problem 
types also potentially raises a limitation on the potential for virtual collaboration. I.e. virtual 
collaboration – as epistemic progress through unintentional creativity – may only be possible with 
certain kinds of problems. Steiner’s (1972) taxonomy of task types distinguishes between how the 
division of cognitive and physical labour can be divided in differing kinds of problems (he also 
demarcates some tasks which cannot be divided at all). For instance, he differentiates between problem 
types which are additive (where all members of a collaboration add their efforts together in some 
manner) and those which are disjunctive (where some procedure selects the efforts of only one 
member of the collaboration towards the task goal). Although Steiner’s taxonomy was developed only 
in reference to actual collaboration, I think we can use it here without too much distortion to consider 
the limits of where virtual collaboration can occur. Viz. it is likely that some problem types may be 
more or less suited to virtual collaboration – but this is an empirical question.  
Collaboration across specialisations also raises another problem related to the issue of sticky 
information discussed above.  In the first section of this paper I noted that members of communities 
of enquiry are inculcated into sets of theoretical vocabulary and styles of thought. But in 
interdisciplinary work it can often be the case that members of differing epistemic communities lack 
a common tongue. In these situations, Galison (1998) notes that practitioners must create a “trading 
zone” in which “technical pidgins” can make the information of one specialist field accessible to 
members of other thought communities. Although this is an extra burden upon the epistemic agents 
involved, it is not an insurmountable one. Indeed, the development of shared technical vocabularies 
and the sharing of theoretical models and experimental designs between differing fields is a common 
practice (see Humphreys 2004).   
As such, I suggest that interdisciplinary problem spaces and fields will be the areas ripest for 
virtual collaboration: the productive recombination of ideas across generations to generate novel 
insights that lead to epistemic progress that are not the product of intentional acts of creativity. This 
suggests a level of optimism with the current state of affairs in some scientific communities because, 
as Andersen (2016) notes, there is an increasing emphasis on interdisciplinary work. These 
interdisciplinary environments are ideal conditions for creating the multiple interconnections for 
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differing ideas, theories, models, and experimental set ups that can then be recombined, reconsidered, 
and redeployed. With the growing number of active scientists in these areas, this increases the chances 
of lucky errors, intentional ingenuity, and chance insights.  
One can perhaps contend that interdisciplinary research is already flourishing and producing 
viable new fields – e.g. biophysics (Braun & Schubert 2003) – and tackling interdisciplinary problems 
– e.g. the combined efforts of engineers and theoretical physicists to build high energy particle 
accelerators (Galison 1998). But I think that the notion of virtual collaboration adds a new element to 
these states of affairs. One which could, if properly exploited, lead to additional and supplementary 
epistemic progress. I suggest that this places an emphasis on increasing academic cross-training and 
examining areas lacking in trading zones. But also, to look for novel combinations between fields that 
are not normally recognised as complementary. The reasoning here is: that as the number and variety 
of interconnections increases so too does the possibility of a productive element emerging through 
sheer lucky error, chance, or combinatorial assortments without intentional creativity (see Henrich 
2016 : 213) 8 . Currently, this is arguably an underexploited aspect of the sociality of scientific 
communities – with some fields deemed anathema or totally unrelated to one another. Although 
speculative, tapping into the abundance of interdisciplinary work as a resource for epistemic progress 
offers an opportunity for novel contributions which, because of the intergenerational structure of 
virtual collaboration, could lead to tackling problems that defy synchronic and straightforward 
cognitive assaults.   
5. Conclusion 
There is much research in science and technology studies and philosophy of science into the structure 
of scientific communities across both the synchronic and diachronic temporal planes. However, an 
underappreciated aspect of the intergenerational structure of scientific communities is the potential 
for virtual collaboration: the re-combination of culturally accumulated knowledge across generations 
into novel forms without intentional ingenuity. Virtual collaboration is a distinctive feature of the 
human species that allows us to tackle problems that would be beyond a single generation. Given the 
increasing complexity of scientific problem spaces and the requirement for interdisciplinary teamwork, 
there is an opportunity for this form of epistemic engineering by invention through bricolage to be utilised. 
Alongside other attempts to reorganise the structure of scientific communities, the species-specific 
factor of virtual collaboration suggests that science pedagogy and apprenticeship should involve 
interdisciplinary components to facilitate the production of trading zones and seed potential novel re-
combinations of the vast amounts of previously acquired knowledge about nature.  
                                                          
8 It should be noted that each community of enquiry will have its own history of accumulated knowledge – including 
instances of virtual collaboration. Here I have made no distinction between cases which occur within a particular tradition 
and instances that occur in interdisciplinary work. Indeed, I have argued that virtual collaboration is more likely in the 
latter. But, whether these two forms are different in kind or similar is something I leave to be explored in future work. [I 
thank an anonymous reviewer for helping me to clarify this point]. 
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